

SUB-COMMITTEE ON SHIP SYSTEMS AND
EQUIPMENT
4th session
Agenda item 12

SSE 4/12/5
5 January 2017
Original: ENGLISH

**UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF IMO SAFETY,
SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENT-RELATED CONVENTIONS**

**Unified interpretation on the fire integrity of the bulkheads
between the wheelhouse and the navigation lockers inside the wheelhouse**

Submitted by IACS

SUMMARY

Executive summary: Following the invitation of SSE 3, this document provides a draft unified interpretation on the fire integrity of the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse. Such interpretation is intended to facilitate the global and consistent application of tables 9.3, 9.5 and 9.7 of SOLAS regulation II-2/9

Strategic direction: 1.1

High-level action: 1.1.2

Output: 1.1.2.3

Action to be taken: Paragraph 8

Related documents: SSE 3/12/1 and SSE 3/16, paragraphs 12.23 and 12.24

Introduction

1 The Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE), at its third session, considered document SSE 3/12/1 (IACS), which sought clarification on the fire integrity of the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse.

2 The report of SSE 3 (SSE 3/16, paragraph 12.24) states:

"Following discussion, the Sub-Committee invited IACS, taking into account the comments made at this session, to prepare the draft unified interpretation for consideration at SSE 4."

Discussion

3 With regard to the fire integrity of a navigation locker, IACS opined in document SSE 3/12/1 that it was more appropriate to consider the navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse as a control station, rather than as a service space (low or high risk depending on the area) in terms of facilitating fire safety. The Sub-Committee did not object to this understanding. As shown in figure 1 below, a navigation locker would be better protected from the fire in the cabin below when treated as a control station, rather than as a service space.




Figure 1

4 Based on the above understanding, i.e. a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse is better treated as a control station, document SSE 3/12/1 provided two views on the relationship between the wheelhouse and a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse, as well as the fire integrity of the bulkheads separating them, as follows:

- .1 A navigation locker (control station) should be treated as an independent space from the wheelhouse (control station). Thus, the bulkhead between such a navigation locker and the wheelhouse should be insulated in accordance with tables 9.3, 9.5 and 9.7 of SOLAS regulation II-2/9, as is the case for the bulkhead between two control stations. In this regard, the bulkhead may have a "B-0" fire rating by applying note (e) to table 9.5 and note (c) to tables 9.3 and 9.7 which state:

"Table 9.3 – Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces

Notes: To be applied to tables 9.3 and 9.4, as appropriate.

- c Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse and chartroom from each other may have a "B-0" rating. No fire rating is required for those partitions separating the navigation bridge and the safety control centre when the latter is within the navigation bridge.

Table 9.5 – Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces

Notes: To be applied to tables 9.5 and 9.6, as appropriate.

e Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room from each other may have a "B-0" rating.

Table 9.7 – Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces

Notes: To be applied to tables 9.7 and 9.8, as appropriate.

c Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room from each other may have a "B-0" rating."

.2 Such a navigation locker, being classified in the same category as the wheelhouse, may be considered as a part of the wheelhouse. Thus, the bulkhead between such a navigation locker and the wheelhouse can be exempted from the insulation, as those spaces are treated as a single control station.

5 According to the report of SSE 3 (SSE 3/16, paragraph 12.23):

"... the Sub-Committee noted that a clear majority of those who spoke were of the opinion that a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse should not be considered as part of the control station with respect to the requirements in tables 9.3, 9.5 and 9.7 of SOLAS regulation II-2/9 and the division separating the wheelhouse and such a locker should have a "B-0" fire rating."

While IACS is concerned that the wording "...a navigation locker...should not be considered as part of the control station..." could be misinterpreted as "a navigation locker should not be considered as a control station"; the intent of the conclusion of the discussion at SSE 3 is clear, in particular:

.1 a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse should not be considered as a part of wheelhouse; and

.2 the bulkhead separating them should be insulated properly.

6 If the navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse is not considered as a control station (figure 1(b) above), the deck between such navigation locker and the cabin below is not required to be insulated to "A-60". If this is the case, it will compromise the fire integrity of the navigation locker.

7 Having considered the above, IACS has prepared a draft unified interpretation, as set out in the annex, in order to clarify that a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse should not be regarded as a part of the wheelhouse but as an independent control station, and that the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and such navigation locker should have "B-0" fire rating on the basis of the "notes" relevant to bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room.

Action requested of the Sub-Committee

8 The Sub-Committee is invited to consider the foregoing and the draft unified interpretation as set out in the annex, and take action as appropriate.

ANNEX

DRAFT UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF SOLAS REGULATION II-2/9

SOLAS REGULATIONS II-2/9.2.2.4.2, II-2/9.2.3.3.2 AND II-2/9.2.4.2.2

Fire integrity of the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and a navigation locker inside the wheelhouse

"Table 9.3 – Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces

...

Notes: To be applied to both tables 9.3 and 9.4, as appropriate.

...

- c Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse and chartroom from each other may have a "B-0" rating. No fire rating is required for those partitions separating the navigation bridge and the safety control centre when the latter is within the navigation bridge.

...

Table 9.5 - Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces

...

Notes: To be applied to tables 9.5 and 9.6, as appropriate.

...

- e Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room from each other may have a "B-0" rating.

...

Table 9.7 - Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces

...

Notes: To be applied to tables 9.7 and 9.8, as appropriate.

...

- c Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room from each other may have a "B-0" rating."

Interpretation

A navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse should be considered as a control station with respect to the requirements in tables 9.3, 9.5 and 9.7 of SOLAS regulation II-2/9, and the bulkhead separating the wheelhouse and such a locker should have a "B-0" fire integrity.
